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Abstract 
Many of the railroad demand studies are out-dated, lacking the most recent data.  We felt 
that it is time to re-evaluate the rail markets to determine if changes have occurred in the 
determinants of railroad demand.  This paper examines the effects of industrial production and 
revenue per ton of railroads on the demand for railroad service for selected manufactured goods.  
Also there appears to be a fundamental shift in railroad pricing after 2004.  Thus a dummy 
variable for the 2005-2010 period was included in the model.  Although there is variation in the 
price elasticity of demand across the manufactured goods markets, all are price inelastic. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Since the Staggers Act of 1980, there has been a total restructuring of the U.S. rail 
industry.  Through deregulation, firms were unrestricted in their ability to price their services 
which changed the relationship between railroads and shippers (Burton 1993).  This can be seen 
through changes in composition of the demand for rail transportation.  The objective of the thesis 
is to demonstrate through the use of linear regression modeling that fundamental differences 
have occurred in the post 2004 era in the demand for rail service. 
 Changes in policy have enabled railroads to become more efficient.  The deregulation of 
the industry has decreased the variable costs by as much as 41 to 44 percent in 1989 (Wilson 
1997).  By being able to offer a lower price to shippers, the quantity demanded for rail 
transportation has increased in the post deregulation era. 
 Rail mergers also played a key part in the restructuring of the industry.  In 1980, there 
were 40 Class I railroads compared to just seven in 2011.  Through time there has been an 
increase in the efficiency of rail transportation by being able to capture more pronounced 
economies of scale and lower the cost per-ton mile for freight.  Mergers have also allowed better 
service capabilities by being able to ship more commodities longer distances without have to 
interchange as much with other rail carriers (Association of American Railroads 2011).  The 
merger between Union Pacific Railroad Co. and the Southern Pacific Transportation Co. in 1996 
made it the largest rail transport firm at the time.  The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
allowed the merger because of the cost savings and service quality that the merged railroad could 
provide to its customers in the western United States (Breen 2004).  There were several 
occasions where multiple smaller railroads joined together to achieve a lower cost structure and 
provide greater levels of service to its customers. 
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 The Staggers Act also allowed railroads to abandon or sell unprofitable sections of track 
in a timelier manner allowing them to focus on the areas that would provide the largest amounts 
of revenue (MacDonald and Cavalluzzo 1996).  Many short line railroads formed through the 
abandonment of track by large Class I railroads providing much needed rail service in rural 
areas.  They are crucial to rural areas to provide for the movement of commodities that would 
otherwise be impossible or impractical due the high costs of other modes of transportation.  Short 
line railroads accounted for 43,003 miles of track in 2010 which is 31% of the national rail 
network (Association of American Railroads, Railroad Facts 2011). 
 Many of the studies of rail demand are outdated, lacking the most recent data in their 
calculations.  It is time to re-evaluate the markets to see what has happened in recent years.  The 
main objective is to measure the demand for railroad service in the following markets: food and 
kindred products, lumber and wood products, chemicals and allied products, petroleum and coal 
products, stone, clay, and glass products, primary metal products, and transportation equipment.  
These markets account for nearly 92% of rail manufactured goods tonnage in 2010.  Another 
objective is to determine whether an OLS regression model can be applied to estimate rail 
demand.  Lastly we examined whether there are structural breaks in the demand for rail service. 
 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 Levin (1979) examines the impact of ICC rate regulation on the allocation of surface 
freight traffic among the different modes.  He uses a multinomial logit model to estimate the 
traffic in manufactured commodities among truck, rail boxcar, and piggyback.  The author is 
trying to determine the amount of misallocation attributable to regulatory rate distortion in rail 
transportation. 
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 The author makes the market share a function of the rate charged by transport mode, 
commodity value x mean transit time per mode, and the standard deviation of transit time for 
each mode.  The market share is a ratio of either boxcar to truck or piggyback to truck.   
 He found that the total dead-weight loss attributed to the regulation of rail prices for 1972 
to be between 53 and 135 million dollars.  This was found by the difference in substituting 
marginal costs for boxcar and piggyback rates. 
 Oum (1979) formulates a demand model for intercity freight transport as an intermediate 
input to the production and distribution sectors of the economy, and to estimate the price 
elasticities and the elasticities of substitution between the major modes (rail, truck, and water).   
 The author uses a twice continuously differentiable production function relating the gross 
output to capital, labor, and freight transport.  The data is from the Canadian economy 1945-
1974 and it was transformed using a price index for each mode to calculate the revenue per ton 
mile. 
 The author finds that the demand for railway freight services is only slightly responsive 
to the change in railway freight rate; but the own-price elasticity has been increasing in absolute 
value over time.  Also, railway and truck carriers exhibited a complementary relationship until 
1955 when they started really competing with one another.  There is also a highly competitive 
relationship between rail and water carriers that can be seen throughout all years of the data, but 
it has been decreasing slightly over time. 
 Babcock (1980) examines the impact of increasing fuel prices on the truck-rail 
competitive relationship in the intercity freight markets.  Specifically he examines the impact of 
fuel price increases and speed restrictions that prevailed when the study was written.  To achieve 
the objectives of the study Babcock uses both a micro study, which examined the impact of fuel 
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price increases on the rail-truck distance crossover point, and a macro study that examines the 
effect of energy-related variables on rail tonnage originated. 
 The macro model makes rail freight originated a function of the ratio of rail price to truck 
price, value added by manufacture, and the ratio of average truck speed to average rail speed.  
The equations were estimated for three regions and nine commodities.  In the micro model 
distance cost functions were estimated for 1973 for both modes.  The line haul costs are modified 
to reflect 1980 fuel prices.  Then the distance crossover point is recalculated to estimate the 
impact of fuel price increases. 
 The author found that railroads did not benefit from the 1970s energy crunch in terms of 
originated freight despite the improvement in the competitive position produced by fuel price 
increases.  Babcock also found that the distance crossover point declined from 85 miles to 62 
miles.  Thus the increase in fuel prices substantially reduced the cost competitive distance of 
truck with rail. 
 Friedlaender and Spady (1980) analyze the demand for freight transportation with freight 
being a productive input in the firm and which should be treated like any other input and the full 
costs of transportation should include inventory costs as well as shipping and storage.  The 
authors derive an explicit freight demand equation from a general cost function recognizing the 
interrelationship between rates and inventory cost through shipment characteristics.   
 The demand equation is generated from a cost function that uses labor, capital, materials 
and energy, rail transportation, and truck transportation to produce an aggregate output.  Since 
firms are unable to adjust factor usage instantaneously, it is assumed that a short run cost 
function is desirable.   
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 The authors find that commodities such as iron and steel products, electrical machinery, 
and food appear to have an elastic demand.  By region, the demand for rail service in the 
southern region appears to be elastic.  The cross price elasticities between rail and truck service 
are low in absolute value across all goods in all areas suggesting a large amount of independence 
between the two modes.  The authors note that this is reasonable since most of the data for trucks 
that they used was for LTL shipments which are not a strong competitor for rail. 
 Winston (1981) notes that previous work in freight transportation has focused on the 
aggregate approach without considering the underlying behavior of the firms responsible for 
actually making the mode-choice decision.  The author looks at these choices as it applies to 
intermodal competition.  This was done by developing a random expected utility model that was 
suitable for econometric analysis comparing both regulated and un-regulated motor freight and 
rail. 
 The author makes expected utility a function of modal attributes and commodity and firm 
characteristics that has been divided into two different elements, observed and unobserved parts.  
This is further broken down into the observed part and a stochastic term representative of a 
random parameter, modal attributes, and an independent identically distributed disturbance.   
 It was found that the commodity groups most sensitive to service quality are perishable 
products or inputs to perishables products.  Conversely, the commodity groups that are least 
sensitive to service quality are neither perishable nor likely to have storage problems such as 
storage costs or demand.  Generally, freight charges and location have the most explanatory 
power with tangible shipping costs tending to play a dominant role in mode choice decisions. 
 Levin (1981) attempts to predict the impact of rate flexibility on rail prices, profitability, 
and economic welfare in a deregulated rail industry to ascertain whether it will restore the rail 
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industry to financial viability by generating a cash flow large enough to maintain and improve 
high quality rail service.  A secondary objective is to determine the presence of railroad market 
power sufficient to generate excessive increases in profits, prices, and the associated dead-weight 
losses. 
 The author uses a multinomial logit model where truck, piggyback, and rail in 1972 for 
349 markets are explained by intermodal differences in rates, by the inventory costs of 
differences in speed and reliability, and unobserved attributes of modes and shippers.  The author 
used 1972 data although 1977 Census of Transportation data was available at the time the study 
was written.  This was based on the possibility that the results could be affected by initial steps to 
deregulate the railroads. 
 The author finds that for any given degree of inter-railroad competition, average rate 
increases on manufacturers are greater than for the primary bulk commodities and the amount of 
competition has a large influence on the level of rates.  This shows that rail demand is more 
elastic in the sample markets than for bulk commodities.  Also, truck deregulation will only 
provide a mild restraint on the increase of rail rates.  With the amount of intermodal competition, 
it is unlikely that railroads will merge and form some sort of monopoly or a collusion of 
oligopolies, but the industry should be able to improve its capital stock by raising its rate of 
return. 
 Babcock and German (1983) forecast 1985 railroad market shares for 12 intercity 
manufactured goods freight markets.  The authors note that the railroad share of these markets 
declined in the 1955-1980 period while the truck share rose.  One of the principal objectives of 
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 was to arrest the decline of rail market shares.  Whether this would 
occur is the primary question addressed by this paper. 
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 The authors employ a model in which railroad market share (measured by ratio of a rail 
tonnage index to an index of industrial production) is made a function of the ratio of the rail rate 
to the truck rate, the prime interest rate, and the ratio of truck service to rail service.  Truck 
service is measured by interstate highway miles as a percent of total highway miles.  Rail service 
is measured by an index of average daily freight car miles.  The authors found the potential 
forecast performance of the estimated rail share equations to be excellent. 
 The authors also found that rail market shares would continue to decline in about half of 
the 12 markets if truck service improved relative to rail service.  If the decline in rail service 
relative to truck service is arrested, railroad market shares increase in all 12 markets.  The 
principal conclusion of the paper is that the secular decline of railroads was ending in most 
transport markets by the middle 1980s. 
 Harris and Winston (1983) try to estimate possible consequences of both parallel and 
vertical mergers.  This is done by measuring the cost saving for firms and the improvements in 
rail service quality.  The authors used an ordinary least squares regression of total cost as a 
function of loaded freight cars, loaded freight car miles, loaded freight car hours, loaded freight 
cars x urban dummy variable, route miles, and route miles x urban dummy variable.  The data 
comes from the Association of American Railroads and includes 90% of rail movements in 51 
major inter-urban markets for the month of October 1976.  They simulated vertical mergers by 
decreasing the number of carriers on each route and horizontal mergers through decreasing the 
number of carriers and routes in each market. 
 The authors found that vertical mergers with a 33% reduction in the number of carriers 
per route have the potential to decrease the variable costs for firms by 9%-18%.  With horizontal 
mergers, the anti-competitive effects outweigh the cost savings so the variable cost would 
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increase.  They also found that shippers would be significantly better off from vertical mergers, 
and worse off from the anti-competitive effects of parallel mergers.  Vertical mergers result in 
several shipper advantages that are not present in horizontal mergers including faster transit 
times (and thus lower inventory costs), direct service to more markets, and less record keeping 
costs. 
 Morrison and Winston (1985) estimate a behavioral disaggregate model of intercity 
passenger transportation demand for vacation travelers with regards to multiple mode options: 
bus, rail, plane, and car. 
 The authors use a model that determines the indirect utility of travelers by maximizing 
their income minus price of destination, price of transportation mode, price of rental car x 
dummy, and a vector of explanatory variables including traveler, mode, and destination 
characteristics.  The data came from the National Travel Survey covering 1,893 household 
vacation trips with 3,623 travelers and including 607 directional city pairs for the year 1977. 
 Both buses and rail could be successful in obtaining more demand through reducing their 
travel time and time between departures.  Car could increase its market share from a decrease in 
its costs, such as the price of fuel, for short to medium length trips. 
 German and Babcock (1994) note that there has been comparatively little recognition and 
virtually no measurement of the effect of major socio-economic trends on rail traffic.  The 
objective of the study is to develop a framework-procedure for measuring the impact of the 
decline of the U.S. middle class on U.S. railroad tonnage and employment.  The specific 
objectives of the study are (1) measure the impact of income distribution on single family 
housing starts, (2) measure the impact of the change in single family housing starts on railroad 
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lumber traffic, and (3) measure the impact of the change in railroad lumber traffic on railroad 
employment. 
 The first specific objective is achieved by formulation of a model of single family 
housing starts which are made a function of disposable personal income, the new home mortgage 
interest rate, and percent of U.S. adults age 25 to 50 in the high income class. 
 The second specific objective is development of a railroad lumber tonnage model which 
is made a function of single family housing starts from the first objective, railroad price relative 
to truck price, and the interest rate.  The third objective is achieved through development of a 
railroad employment model which is made a function of an index of the cubic capacity of the 
average truck trailer manufactured in a given year, total railroad originated tonnage minus 
lumber, and railroad originated lumber tonnage. 
 
Chapter 3 - Model and Data 
 
 The variables in the empirical model are suggested by results of previous freight demand 
models.  The model is as follows: 
 
Toni= Rtoni + Ipi + Prime + ExIm + Railspeed/Interstate + Dummy + ei 
  
Where: 
Toni – Railroad tons originated, industry i 
Rtoni – Railroad revenue per originated ton, industry i 
Ipi – Industrial production, industry i 
Prime – U.S. prime interest rate 
ExIm – U.S. exports of non-agricultural products plus imports of non-petroleum products 
Railspeed – U.S. freight train miles/train hours 
Interstate – U.S. interstate highway miles 
Dummy- Equal to 1.0 for 2005-2010; 0 in other years 
ei – disturbance term, industry i 
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 The theoretically expected sign for Rtoni is negative since an increase in railroad price 
would have a negative effect on rail tonnage. 
 Transportation demand is derived from the demand for production.  Thus if industrial 
production increases the demand for rail transport would increase, resulting in an increase in rail 
tonnage.  Accordingly the theoretically expected sign of industrial production is positive. 
 The theoretically expected sign of the interest rate variable is negative.  If interest rates 
increase, industrial production would decrease.  This would result in a negative effect on railroad 
tonnage.  Also, a rise in interest rates would increase firm inventory costs.  If firms react to this 
by reducing the shipment size of incremental additions to inventory, it would increase truck 
shipments since the average shipment size of truck is much less than railroads.  Thus, the interest 
rate would have a negative effect on rail tonnage. 
 Goods are transported from the interior states to the coasts for export.  In the opposite 
way, imports are transported from the coasts to the interior states.  In both cases, increases in 
imports or exports will increase the demand for transportation of goods.  So, the theoretically 
expected sign is positive for imports plus exports. 
 Transportation service is measured in relative terms with rail service in the numerator and 
truck service in the denominator.  Transportation service is multi-dimensional, including, but not 
limited to the following: delivery time, dependability of delivery time, frequency of service, 
door-to-door delivery, flexibility, loss and damage record, and shipment tracking capability. 
 No transportation trade association or regulatory body has ever published any of these 
service factors.  Thus, imperfect proxies must be used.  The motor carrier service proxy is 
interstate highway miles.  This variable does not directly measure any of the service parameters 
mentioned above.  However, the interstate highway system facilitated gains in many aspects of 
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motor carrier service such as delivery time, dependability of delivery time, and safety.  Rail 
service is proxied by freight train speed (freight train miles/ train hours). 
 The theoretically expected sign of the relative service variable is positive since an 
increase in rail service relative to truck service would increase rail tonnage. 
 In the 2005-2010 period railroads increased their prices by more than they had 
previously, possibly due to a significant increase in railroad costs.  Rail cost recovery index 
increased 39.2% between 2004-2010, but only 25.2% between 1995 and 2003.  To account for 
this change a dummy variable equal to 1.0 in each year of the 2005-2010 period and zero for 
other years was included in the model.  Since the cause of this change in pricing behavior is 
unknown, the theoretically expected sign of the dummy variable is indeterminate. 
 The model was estimated for the 1964-2010 period.  The data for tons originated and 
revenue per ton was obtained from the Association of American Railroads Freight Commodity 
Statistics, various issues.  The Association of American Railroads also provided the data for train 
speed (freight train miles/ train hours) from their Railroad Facts, various issues.  Train hours 
were provided by the editor of Railroad Facts.  Interstate highway miles came from the U.S. 
Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, various issues. 
 It is desirable to include truck price in the model which is the principal intermodal 
competitor of railroads.  Revenue per ton mile of LTL motor carriers was published in 
Transportation in America 2000 for 1964-1999 and in Transportation in America 20
th
 edition for 
2000-2003.  However railroads do not compete with LTL motor carriers, they compete with TL 
motor carriers.  There is no time series data for TL motor carrier prices. 
 U.S exports of non-agricultural products plus imports of non-petroleum products was 
from President’s Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President, 2011.  Prime 
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interest rate also is from President’s Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the 
President, 2011.  Industrial production is from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. 
Chapter 4 - Empirical Results 
 
 Some of the explanatory variables in the model had multicollinearity problems with other 
variables and were dropped from the final empirical model.  The final model is: 
 
Toni= Rtoni + Ipi + Dummy + ei 
 
 The empirical results are in Tables 1 and 2.  In Table 1, the variables are in non-logs and 
in Table 2 expressed in logs.  An examination of Table 1 reveals that all the explanatory 
variables have the theoretically expected sign and most of them are statistically significant at the 
1% level.  The only exceptions are industrial production in the food and kindred products 
equation and the dummy variable in the transportation equipment equation.  All the equations 
have a good fit with adjusted R
2
 ranging from a low of 0.61 for food and kindred products to a 
high of 0.97 for chemicals and allied products.  All the equations in Table 1 initially had 
statistically significant auto correlation but this was corrected using Newey-West standard errors 
with a lag of 3. 
 The results for the log specification of the variables are displayed in Table 2 and are very 
similar to the results in Table 1.  All the explanatory variables have the theoretically expected 
sign and most are significant at the 1% level.  Variables that are non-significant include 
industrial production in the food and kindred products equation, the dummy variable in the 
petroleum products equation, and the dummy variable in the transportation equipment equation. 
Better statistical results were obtained without the dummy variable in the lumber and wood 
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products equation.  All the equations have a good fit with adjusted R
2
 ranging from a low of 0.61 
for food and kindred products to a high of 0.97 for chemicals and allied products.  As was the 
case for the non-log specification, all the equations in Table 2 initially had statistically 
significant auto correlation but this was corrected using Newey-West standard errors with a lag 
of 3. 
 An examination of the rail price variable coefficients in Table 2 indicates that rail 
demand is price inelastic in all the markets.  However, the elasticities vary across markets from a 
low of 0.23 for chemicals and allied products to a high of 0.78 for lumber and wood products. 
 The empirical evidence of a structural break in railroad demand in the 2005-2010 period 
is strong.  In Table 1 the dummy variable is statistically significant in six of the seven equations, 
and in four of the seven cases in Table 2.  Thus the dummy variable was statistically significant 
in 71.4 percent of the 14 equations. 
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Table 1: Empirical Results, Non-logged Specification 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Probability 
Food and Kindred Products (20) 
Rton -1380.673 -4.24** 0.000 
Ip 195.9641 1.44 0.157 
Dummy 27646.8 4.58** 0.000 
Constant 109764 15.52 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.6165   
Lumber and Wood Products (24) 
Rton -2765.741 -6.30** 0.000 
Ip 375.5813 2.28* 0.027 
Dummy 44871.69 3.44** 0.001 
Constant 99595.96 12.00 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.8895   
Chemicals and Allied Products (28) 
Rton -699.1385 -2.96** 0.005 
Ip 1318.974 16.92** 0.000 
Dummy 12245.11 2.09* 0.043 
Constant 42821.14 12.8 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.9696   
Petroleum and Coal Products (29) 
Rton -676.871 -3.76** 0.001 
Ip 613.9369 6.50** 0.000 
Dummy 6800.999 2.59* 0.013 
Constant 1689.533 0.24 0.810 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.7175   
Stone, Clay Glass, and Concrete Products (32) 
Rton -2169.741 -16.80** 0.000 
Ip 231.2307 5.07** 0.000 
Dummy 21254.59 7.69** 0.000 
Constant 74897.75 23.25 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.9217   
Primary Metal Products (33) 
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Rton -1951.978 -5.77** 0.000 
Ip 359.2521 4.14** 0.000 
Dummy 34921.81 4.37** 0.000 
Constant 59140.59 4.20 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.7915   
Transportation Equipment (37) 
Rton -142.5743 -6.41** 0.000 
Ip 344.4825 15.29** 0.000 
Dummy -2138.688 -1.62 0.113 
Constant 16912.31 6.60 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.7870   
*significant at 5% level 
** Significant at the 1% level 
Numbers in parenthesis following the commodity name are the standard transportation industrial 
code numbers 
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Table 2: Empirical Results, Log Specification 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Probability 
Food and Kindred Products (20) 
Rton -.3588928 -3.74** 0.001 
Ip .250355 1.76 0.086 
Dummy .2363098 5.02** 0.000 
Constant 11.46102 29.22 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.6126   
Lumber and Wood Products (24) 
Rton -.7757609 -8.33** 0.000 
    
Ip .6589186 2.20* 0.033 
Dummy    
Constant 10.51785 9.41 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.8659   
Chemicals and Allied Products (28) 
Rton -.2319248 -4.05** 0.000 
Ip .7965673 14.43** 0.000 
Dummy .1154938 2.93** 0.005 
Constant 9.49064 76.73 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.9682   
Petroleum and Coal Products (29) 
Rton -.2800091 -3.56** 0.000 
Ip 1.367995 6.83** 0.000 
Dummy .0658721 1.19 0.241 
Constant 5.348242 9.94 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.7268   
Stone, Clay Glass, and Concrete Products (32) 
Rton -.6193791 -15.96** 0.000 
Ip .5671079 6.19** 0.000 
Dummy .1870066 6.17** 0.000 
Constant 10.13612 32.86 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.9296   
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Primary Metal Products (33) 
Rton -.5569052 -9.57** 0.000 
Ip 1.136729 8.55** 0.000 
Dummy .3983874 5.31** 0.000 
Constant 7.26892 11.70 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.8703   
Transportation Equipment (37) 
Rton -.327991 -4.34** 0.000 
Ip .8363946 9.43** 0.000 
Dummy -.0923239 -1.23 0.225 
Constant 8.155372 23.57 0.000 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.6336   
*significant at 5% level 
** Significant at the 1% level 
Numbers in parenthesis following the commodity name are the standard transportation industrial 
code numbers 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 
 This paper has attempted to use the most recent data in identifying the demand for 
railroad transportation of manufactured products.  In doing so, it was shown how ordinary least 
squares regression can be used for the purposes of measuring the demand for rail transport, and it 
was  observed that there are fundamental differences in the makeup of this demand in the post 
2004 time period. 
 The initial explanatory variables in the model did not all turn out to be significant or have 
the theoretically correct sign, possibly due to multicollinearity.  After dropping these from the 
model, we were able to develop an equation that can be used to measure railroad demand of 
manufactured goods.   
 Rail demand was price inelastic in all the markets.  However, there was variation in the 
price elasticities across the seven markets.  The price inelasticity is to be expected given the high 
level of aggregation of the model.  As the level of aggregation becomes more disaggregated, the 
substitution possibilities increase for shippers.  Thus the price elasticities for an individual 
railroad would be more price elastic then the elasticities estimated by the model which pertain to 
the entire rail industry. 
 As far as the changes in the structure of demand over time, this was addressed through 
the implementation of a dummy variable.  The dummy variable was significant for most of the 
commodities that we investigated, indicating a structural break in rail demand in the 2005-2010 
period. 
 The model developed in this thesis can be used to forecast railroad demand.  Forecasts 
are useful for transportation policy makers.  They could be used to assess the impact of 
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regulatory changes on the relative shares of railroads in the various transportation markets.  The 
model could also be used to measure the impact of increased fuel prices in truck-rail competition. 
 Forecasts of railroad transportation demand are essential for railroads.  They can reveal 
which markets offer the greatest potential, and also opportunities for market penetration at the 
expense of rivals.  Even if specific forecasts are eventually in error, the forecasting exercise is 
still worthwhile for the railroad.  This is because forecasting forces a consideration of the major 
factors affecting transportation markets and can ultimately improve railroad investment planning 
strategy. 
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